In my 2018 Book, Reforming
the Presidential Nominating Process: Front-Loading’s Consequences and National
Primary Reform, I argue that from the perspective of party members, the
only way to ensure the full, timely and meaningful participation of all voters
is to reform the current sequential and front-loading presidential primary
calendar.
The national primary solution is
one which has been long-resisted as politically impractical. However, in their
effort to gain greater influence in the modern (post-1968) nominating process,
the states routinely jockey for earlier or more advantageous calendar
positions, hoping to maximize their voters’ voice in the selection of
presidential nominees. This phenomenon has created a front-loaded calendar in which
voters in the early-state contests exert outsized influence and more states
schedule contests toward the beginning of the contest window.
In his recent piece in the New York Times, Nate Cohn
argues that the 2020 nominating calendar is moving ever-closer to a national
primary. Relative to 2016, the 2020 calendar is more heavily front-loaded. There
are fewer contest dates, fewer caucuses, an end-calendar line-up of relatively
rural states, and an earlier close to the nominating phase. The earlier shift
of key states, particularly California and Texas, additionally make the early
primary electorate more representative than in past cycles. (Cohn looks
specifically at the share of African-American voters by primary date relative
to 2016). California and Texas will hold their 2020 presidential primaries on
March 3, also known as Super-Tuesday (the earliest allowable date for most
states to hold contests under the timing rules set by the national political
party organization). (The other states scheduled for Super-Tuesday include
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont. The South Carolina and Virginia
Democratic party-primaries will also be held on that date). The number and
geographic diversity of contests makes Super-Tuesday, with nearly 1/3 of both
parties’ delegates at stake, a pseudo-national event. By contrast, the contests
scheduled for April 28 (which include Connecticut, Delaware,
Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, along with the Virginia
Republican primary) are a more-regionalized event.
The net effect of the 2020 calendar,
Cohn argues, is a nominating process that is more geographically balanced,
faster, and demographically representative. A look at the weekly allocation of
delegates in the figures below highlights Cohn’s point that the schedule has
compressed more contests into fewer dates. For both parties, March 3
(Super-Tuesday), March 17, and April 28 stand out as high-stakes delegate
caches in which several big and battle ground states are up for grabs. These 3
dates simulate mini-national primaries – forcing candidates to simultaneously
compete in more (and large states) holding contests on the same day. As Cohn notes, the compression of contests
forces candidates to adapt strategies more akin to a general election campaign as
opposed to the retail politics that takes place in small, or early contests
where the extended focus is on much smaller slice of the electorate.
Cohn also points out that the
number of states holding primaries in 2020 is greater than in past cycles. As
tracked in the gray-bar in the figure below, 45 states will hold primaries in 2020, 47%
of which will be on or before March 15.
Conventional wisdom holds that
caucuses, which are meetings of party members, tend to favor outsider
candidates. In the lower turnout caucuses retail (personalized) style
politicking is more efficacious for candidates who may be lagging in name
recognition or financial resources. By contrast, in primaries where the turnout
is higher, candidates must adopt campaign strategies to reach wider swaths of
party voters with greater reliance on costly media advertising.
Moreover, caucuses are comprised of a
smaller-base of party faithful (i.e. more ideologically extreme) while
primaries include a broader spectrum of party voters. Thus, the higher number
of primaries rewards more moderate candidates who have higher name recognition
and greater resources – again approximating and requiring candidates to adapt
strategies more in line with what we would expect to see with a national
primary (i.e., when competing in multiple contests simultaneously).
But while 2020 is more front-loaded
relative to 2016, it is actually less so than in recent past cycles. A look at
the number of states holding primaries on or before March 15 reveals greater
front-loading in the 1996-2008 cycles. Charting the growth of Super-Tuesday
similarly shows a peak of the front-loading phenomenon in the 1996-2008
nominations. In 2008, 51.42% of pledged Democratic delegates and 50.71% of
Republican delegates were chosen on February 5 (Super-Tuesday). Super-Tuesday
was also, notably in February – the earliest date on which the big-prize day ever
has been held. The pace of front-loading in 2008 led to fears of a defacto national primary, thereby prompting
the national parties to coordinate to push back the start and spread out the
sequence of the 2012 contests by offering bonus delegates (Democrats) and
winner-take all rules (Republicans) for states willing to schedule later
contests.
The Iowa
and New Hampshire Juggernaut
Despite the acceleration and
compression of the calendar, so long as the parties retain a sequential
calendar in which a handful of states enjoy a privileged position of voting
first and early, accompanied by crowding within first-part of the window,
we are still a long-way off from a truly
national primary in which all contests would be held on the same day (a
same-day national primary) or at the very least where all states have an equal
chance of participating an early and influential date that affords their voters
a meaningful choice – that is, the
opportunity to vote on a full slate of candidates before earlier contests have
winnowed the field, or worse, have already mathematically determined the
nomination (i.e. some form of a rotating, regional primary).
The major impediment to a truly
national primary is the lock enjoyed by the early, carve-out states, most
notably Iowa and New Hampshire. The now-coveted status of holding the
first-in-the-nation contests was the result of Iowa and New Hampshire having
had traditionally early nominating dates that were granted waivers under the
post-1968 rules. As early as 1976, candidates had adopted strategies that
focused heavily on these early contests as means of building early-win momentum.
Reaping the advantage of the
focused attention on their state’s contests (in the form of campaign visits,
media coverage, policy concessions, and revenue), Iowa and New Hampshire have since
fought bitterly to retain their privileged status. In 2008, acquiescing to
demands to include states with more geographical and demographic diversity to
the pre-primary window, the Democratic Party added the Nevada caucuses and the
South Carolina party-primary as two additional carve-out states exempted from
the timing rules. The push by other states to move forward – most infamously
challenges by Florida and Michigan in 2008 to leapfrog and crowd the early
states – have been firmly rebuffed by the national party organization through
the imposition of delegate penalties at the national conventions.
Early State
Strategies in 2020
In the 2016 cycle, there were some
signs that the primacy of these early states was slipping as several candidates
skipped the Iowa straw polls and associated campaigning opportunities to attend
fundraising events in the upcoming Super-Tuesday states. Split-decisions in
which the early state outcomes have gone for different candidates (as opposed
to breaking in the same direction) have also arguably diluted the power of
these first contests to shape the nomination. Where the early state contests
are a wash, attention quickly moves on to Super-Tuesday.
As Cohn notes, the sequence of the contests matters. The sequence
of contests varies with the dynamics of each nominating cycle, including
state-scheduling decisions and candidate strategies. 2020 presents an
opportunity in which the role of the early states may be significantly challenged.
The compression and acceleration of
front-loading is drawing into question reliance on the momentum model in which
candidates focus heavily on the first contests despite their small share of
delegates. In this traditional, post-1968 momentum model, candidates try to
springboard off early wins in Iowa and New Hampshire (and now) Nevada and South
Carolina into Super-Tuesday with momentum and media coverage. Rivals who fare
poorly, or who perform worse than expected, are forced to withdraw from the
race. Obama’s claim to the nomination in 2008, for example, is traceable to his
unexpected win in Iowa. Such early
successes (or failures) shape the media narrative with its traditional
horse-race aspect of focusing on who is pulling ahead or falling behind,
creating a feedback loop of voter excitement and enthusiasm. In 2020,
candidates like Pete Buttigieg, Elizabeth Warren, and Bernie Sanders appear to
be following this familiar strategy of trying to lock down early state wins to
build momentum and solidify front-runner status going into Super-Tuesday.
Joe Biden, the current leader in
national polls, who is struggling to retain a lead in the these early contests
appears to be taking on a different approach – building a so-called “firewall.”
Here the goal is to get through the early contests without being knocked out of
contention, and to bank on a big victory in a (still-early) but friendly state.
Biden’s strategy appears to be to finish among the top 3 of Iowa and New
Hampshire then to pull away in South Carolina where he enjoys substantially
higher support from African-American voters who comprise a sizable share of the
South Carolina primary electorate. A similar strategy was adopted by Rudy
Giuliani in seeking the Republican nomination in 2008. Giuliani had hoped to
survive the early contests and secure a big win in Florida (scheduled that year
on January 29 – in a bid by the Sunshine State to challenge the
primacy of the pre-primary states). With its large cache of delegates, the plan
was to springboard off Florida into Super-Tuesday (February 5) with momentum. But
for Giuliani it was both too late and too little (he only came in third) and he
was forced to drop out of the race.
The 2020 calendar has made a third possible
approach – one which would bypass the early contests almost entirely in favor
of a big Super-Tuesday win – potentially more feasible. This strategy treats
Super-Tuesday (March 3) like a pseudo national primary, magnifying the
campaign’s focus on this one-day event. Such is the approach being adopted by
late entrant in the Democratic nominating contest, Michael Bloomberg. In
combination with the calendar, Bloomberg’s great wealth gives him a significant
advantage in this multi-state, geographically diverse Super-Tuesday derby.
Victories in the big prizes of California and Texas would build a delegate lead
and create the momentum to propel him to instant front-runner status while also
creating a narrative of demonstrated electability in a general election,
national face-off with Donald Trump.
If successful, this approach would
potentially break the juggernaut of the early states and put us more firmly on
the path toward a national primary that Cohn sees emerging. However, the
chances of this strategy being successful does not seem likely – currently
polling shows Bloomberg far behind in the current leader-board. Moreover, the
fact that the Democratic party awards its delegates proportionately reduces the
chance that a strong showing (or even sweep) of Super-Tuesday contests would
create an insurmountable lead. (Republicans, on the other hand, use
winner-take-most or winner-take all rules, which translates first place
finishes into the lion’s share of delegates).
Why We
Don’t Have a National Primary Yet
While the pace of the 2020 calendar
is faster (at least relative to 2016) and the early contests within the window
are arguably more geographically balanced and demographically diverse, as long
as the parties retain a sequential series of nominating contests, we will not
truly have a national primary. Under a sequential front-loaded calendar, the
voters in later-voting states remain at a distinct disadvantage, weilding a
diminished voice (and sometimes no voice at all) in the selection of their
party’s nominee. The national party organizations and key states have an
incentive in retaining the contemporary system which starts off small and early.
From the perspective of the voters, however, any sequential, front-loaded
process will always mean that some states’ voters matter more than others – and
that being earlier in the process generally translates to greater choice and
influence.
Between every presidential
selection cycle the national political parties, states, and state party
organizations contemplate rules changes in anticipation of the next
presidential selection. The requisite political support for a same-day national
primary currently does not exist. We are moving closer in some ways, but
compression and acceleration still does not guarantee all party members a right
to full, fair, and timely participation in the process.
Learn More
About It
For those readers who are not familiar with the presidential
selection process a brief primer (also written by Dr. Parshall) is provided
below.
You may also want to follow our blog as Dr. Wendland will be
taking 5 of our students to Iowa in January 2020 to observe first-hand the
retail politics in the nation’s first caucus state (Iowa kicks off the 2020
nominations with its February 3 precinct caucuses).
Both Drs. Parshall and Wendland in the History and Political Science Department have expertise in
presidential nominating politics, having each authored a book and articles on
the subject.
Watch also for a panel-event in April 2020 (in advance of New
York’s April 28th primary) that will feature faculty of History and
Political Science Department in collaboration with colleagues from the American
Studies Center at the University of Warsaw (as part of the Department’s ongoing
faculty exchange through the Polish Studies Center at Daemen College).
Overview of
the Presidential Selection Process (Quick Primer)
The U.S. presidential selection
process is a complex and lengthy process that starts even before the last
election cycle as concluded. The process occurs in multiple stages, the first
of which is the so-called “invisible primary” in which the media, political
experts, and party members (i.e. voters) begin to identify prospective
candidates and gauge their relative electability through public opinion
polling, fund-raising, and political endorsements. No votes are being cast
during this lengthy and informal stage. Rather, potential candidates test the
political waters, form exploratory committees, participate in debates, and
organize a campaign. Insufficient interest or support will lead many to abandon
their presidential aspirations, winnowing the field of aspirants well before
any binding votes are cast.
In the early months of presidential
election years, states and state party organizations will hold presidential
nominating contests in the form of caucuses (multi-stage meeting of party
members) or primaries (intra-party elections). The contours of our contemporary
nominating system were shaped by reforms enacted in 1968 in which the
Democratic Party enacted rules to ensure the full, timely, and fair
participation by all party members in
the selection of their standard bearer.
The post-1968 reforms included the regulation of the timing of
presidential nominating contests as well as the requirement that the results of
the state presidential preference contests would be binding on the delegates at
the national party convention. The result of these reforms was an increase in
the number of states to hold primaries and increased regulation of the state delegate
selection and timing rules by both national party organizations. These
developments both nationalized (bringing state and state party electoral rules under
national party supervision) and democratized the process (shifting control over
the selection of the parties’ nominees to the party members through
participation in state nominating contests).
Today, both political parties
dictate timing rules by setting the date for the commencement of these state
nominating contests. The Democratic National Party first set an opening of a
contest window in 1980, allowing an exception for two states which historically
had early nominating contests – Iowa and New Hampshire – to vote ahead of the
other states. The advantage of being first and early soon became apparent and
Iowa and New Hampshire have since staunchly defended their right to a waiver
from the timing rules in order to protect their first-in-the-nation status. Other
states, were jealous of the influence wielded by voters of these early contests
pushed their nominating elections closer and closer to the front of the timing
window, creating the phenomenon of Super-Tuesday – the clustering of state
contests on the first Tuesday within the window. In 2012, the parties
coordinated to push the start of the window back to March and adopted delegate
selection rules to encourage states to spread out their contests within the
window. Every presidential cycle there is
movement within the window as state legislatures and state party leaders
adjusts their state’s contest date to try and secure maximum advantage (whether
by joining the rush to the front of the calendar, or by identifying a calendar
berth that will maximize focus on their state).
The culmination of Stage II of the
presidential selection process takes place in July/August when the parties hold
their nominating conventions. Since the post-1968 reforms making the results of
the primaries and caucuses binding on the state’s delegates, the national
conventions are largely pro-forma affairs. That is, the winner of the
nomination has already been mathematically determined and one candidate will
enter the convention with majority support to clinch the nomination on the
first ballot. It is also important to note that for years in which an incumbent
president is running for reelection, the nominating process is largely a
one-sided affair. Only rarely is a sitting president challenged for the party
nomination – states still hold the nominating contests (although the
president’s party may forego more expensive primaries in favor of caucuses and
conventions) but the end result is rarely in question. Modern nominating
conventions do serve a purpose, however, as a kick-off to the general election
and as a chance for the nominee to shape the party’s platform for the upcoming
general election (and presidential term
if he/she should win).
Stage III of the presidential
selection process is the general election campaign in which the major party
nominees compete for votes in the general election. The general election (held
on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November) is the day on
which voters cast their presidential preference vote. 48 states employ the unit
rule in which all of that state’s electoral college votes will be awarded to
state-wide winner of the general election. 2 states (Maine and Nebraska award
their electoral college votes corresponding to their Senators on the basis of
the state-wide vote and their electoral college votes corresponding to their
House of Representative members according to the results in that congressional
district). Stage IV, the formal selection of the president (and vice-president), takes
place roughly three-weeks later when the states’ electors convene in their
respective state capitols. A majority of electors (270) is necessary to win the
presidency. In the event that no candidate receives a majority of the
electoral college votes, the presidency will be decided by the House of Representatives
(with each state casting 1 vote).
The final stage of the process is
reform in anticipation of the next presidential cycle. The Republican National
Convention generally sets the nominating rules for the next presidential cycle
at its nominating convention although they are increasingly following the
Democratic National Committee’s example of tinkering with the rules at the
annual national party meetings between presidential selection years. It is during this stage of the process that
the parties adjust their delegate selection and timing rules and that the state
and state party organizations adjust their nominating contest rules and/or
shift their primary dates. The relevant actors in both political parties generally
react to the last presidential selection cycle and in anticipation of the next in
order to maximize their state’s influence and/or their party’s (or incumbent
president’s) chance of winning the presidency.
